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Purpose
Hosting foreign visitors is
a critical responsibility. This is especially true when the foreign national
is from a country that is directly competing against the United States
militarily or economically. The purpose of this web site is to:
- Enhance your understanding
of risks associated with the foreign visits,
- Inform you how to identify
and mitigate these risks, and
- Remind you of your responsibilities
as a host of foreign visitors.

Risks
The Department of Energy (DOE)
is a leader in the development of new and advanced technologies. In order
to discover new technologies, DOE often searches out the individuals and
program from other countries with the desirable scientific and technical
skills and joins them in cooperative and joint ventures to achieve our
goals. By engaging in such ventures, DOE has become a major contributor
to the development of future technologies that benefit the United States
and the world. There are inherent risks with site visits and other associations
with foreign nationals. Even though the "cold war" is officially over,
all countries still pursue their own self-interests. Today the self-interest
of many foreign countries is primarily advanced by economic, rather than
by military means. In today's race for international economic strength
and influence, all countries are competitors.
Site visits or assignments
to DOE facilities provide foreign countries with a low cost and low risk
opportunity to gain access to needed technologies. Most foreign nationals
are here just for their stated purpose. However, a few visitors have a
hidden agenda and are on site to collect information, and this information
doesn't have to be classified to be valuable and desirable. Unclassified
information is often targeted because it is generally more accessible,
easier to obtain and may not be available to the visitor at home.
Host
Responsibilities
Before
you host a foreign visitor or assignee:
- Ensure that the benefits
gained from the visit outweigh their potential risks;
- Determine the areas of
your work that may be sensitive, but not classified, and might shed
light on classified work;
- Assess whether discussion
of selected unclassified information with foreign nationals could divulge
proprietary details related to cooperative research or other collaborative
work at your facility and
- Carefully craft your security
plan to ensure the security of the visit.
During the visit:
- Be alert to indications
that any of your foreign guests might be collecting information on the
basis of intelligence tasking, or might be an intelligence officer.
Some indicators are:
A visitor inquires
too frequently about information outside the stated subject area of
the visit or seeks information and gives little in return;
In a group of visitors,
one individual doesn't have the same level of expertise as others in
the group; does not stay focused on the agenda of the visit; or engages
in incongruous behavior for the occasion;
A "wandering" visitor
who is offended when he is challenged about his presence in locations
away from his normal work space; or
A visitor is overly
curious about people, programs and areas beyond the scope of the visit.
Deflect inquiries that seek
information that should not be shared about you, your colleagues, your
employer, DOE, or other U.S. Government agencies, programs and policies.
Exercise caution
if you assist your foreign visitor with mailing of packages or letters
out of the U.S. Review the contents before mailing.
Monitor computer
access. Often intelligence collectors look for sensitive projects or
proprietary business information on unclassified networks.
Ensure that the
visitor's access is restricted to information and locations approved
for the visit.
Reporting
Requirements
If you suspect a visitor has
a hidden agenda, or if you observe any suspicious behavior, contact your
counterintelligence or security officer. Also report any attempts to probe
for information, efforts to put you in a compromising situation, and any
other anomalous behaviors.
Note: DOE Order 472.1B
and Presidential Decision Directive NSC 12 requires reporting of contacts
with people of any nationality who seek classified or sensitive information
without authorization.
Most foreign contacts are
perfectly legitimate and well meaning. Your ability to recognize the few
who are not will help you avoid problems. It will also help your security
officer help others avoid problems.

Conclusion
As a host in the visit of
a foreign national, you should maintain awareness before the visit, diligence
during the visit and caution in subsequent interactions with the visitor.
As a visit progresses, permanent employees often forget that the visitor
is a foreign national who is only temporally with the Department. Security
restrictions can be forgotten or overlooked. You are personally responsible
for maintaining the security of the visit and for precluding the inadvertent
or unintentional passage of unauthorized information.

Questions?
For additional information
or answers to questions concerning your host responsibilities, contact
the CH counterintelligence office at 630/252-5500 or call the DOE Office
of Counterintelligence at 202/586-1247.
Remember, in today's global
economic competition, knowledge has value. Intellectual property is the
key to our country's continued success.

U.S. Department
of Energy
Chicago Office
Office of Counterintelligence
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