Counterintelligence
In
Our Changing World
Get
PDF Version of Brochure- Contacts With Individuals or Organizations From Sensitive Countries
- National Security Threat List (NSTL)
- Issue Threats
- National Critical Technologies
- Espionage Indicators
National
Security Begins with
You
You may be the target of foreign intelligence activity if you or the Department of Energy are associated with one or more of the critical technologies. Foreign powers may also seek to collect U. S. industrial proprietary economic information and technology, the loss of which would undermine the U. S. strategic industrial position. Foreign intelligence collectors do, today, target information in support of their Nation’s firms. Overseas travel, foreign contact, and joint ventures may further increase your exposure to the efforts of foreign intelligence collectors.
A good rule-of-thumb is to report anything that makes you "feel uncomfortable" to your CIO as soon after-the-fact as possible.
CONTACTS WITH INDIVIDUALS
OR ORGANIZATIONS
FROM SENSITIVE COUNTRIES
The Department of Energy (DOE) requires all employees and contractors to report unofficial contacts with individuals from sensitive countries. Reporting such contacts to other government agencies does not satisfy DOE requirements for notification. Do report:
- Unofficial contacts within or outside the U. S. (social, personal, or other unreported professional settings, such as conferences, where there is significant contact).
- Any attempted elicitation of information or contact (official or unofficial that would indicate a foreign intelligence presence).
- Any contact involving inappropriate efforts to obtain information about a sensitive subject, classified information, or any counterintelligence-related incidents. This may include perceived efforts to obtain sensitive or proprietary data.
- Any contact via telephone, facsimile machine, e-mail, Internet, or other electronic means (usually only the initial contact, official or unofficial).
- Anomalies—foreign power activity or knowledge, inconsistent with the expected norm, that suggests foreign knowledge of U. S. national security information, processes or capabilities.
- Report contacts as soon as possible after occurrence to the CIO. You are not required to notify DOE of "trivial" contacts, such as brief conversations not involving significant content. Contacts included in Chicago Office trip reports need not be reported separately unless there is a concern.
If you have any questions about what constitutes a reportable contact or about the sensitivity of a specific country (the sensitive country list continually changes) contact the Counterintelligence Program Office at 630-252-5500.
NATIONAL SECURITY THREAT LIST (NSTL)
The Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI)’s foreign counterintelligence mission is set out in a strategy known as the National Security Threat List (NSTL). The NSTL combines two elements. First, it includes national security issues that the FBI has concluded need to be addressed no matter where the threat comes from or what country is involved. Second, it includes a classified list of foreign powers that pose a strategic intelligence threat to U.S. security interests.
The issue threat portion of the NSTL was developed in concert with the US Intelligence Community and key elements of the US Government. As a result, the FBI identified eight categories of foreign intelligence activity that were deemed to be significant threats to US national security interests. The FBI will investigate the activities of any country that relate to any of these eight issues.
Foreign Intelligence Activities Involving:
- Terrorism Activities
- Espionage
- Proliferation
- Economic Espionage
- Targeting the National Information Infrastructure
- Targeting the U. S. Government
- Perception Management
- Foreign Intelligence Activities
Foreign powers may also seek to collect US industrial proprietary economic information and technology, the loss of which would undermine the US strategic industrial position.
NATIONAL CRITICAL TECHNOLOGIES
Foreign intelligence activities that are directed at U. S. critical technologies were identified by the National Critical Technologies Panel. These 22 critical technologies are divided into 6 major categories as follows:
Materials
- Materials synthesis and processing
- Electronics and photonic materials
- Ceramics
- Composites
- High-performance metals and alloys
Manufacturing
- Flexible computer-integrated manufacturing
- Intelligence processing equipment
- Micro- and nanofabrication
- Systems management technologies
Information and Communications
- Software
- Micro- and optoelectronics
- High-performance computing and networking
- High-definition imaging and displays
- Sensors and signal processing
- Data storage and peripherals
- Computer simulation and modeling
Biotechnology and Life Sciences
- Applied molecular biology
- Medical technology
Aeronautics and Surface Transportation
- Aeronautics
- Surface transportation technologies
Energy and Environment
- Energy technologies
- Pollution minimization, remediation, and waste management
Individuals involved in espionage each have unique motivators for the betrayal of their country and each has displayed questionable but identifiable behavior.
The following are "red flag" indicators that something could be amiss. If you recognize any of these behaviors in a co-worker, discuss them with your Counterintelligence Officer.
- Any attempt to obtain information for which an individual does not have a need-to-know.
- Unauthorized removal of classified or sensitive unclassified information from the work area.
- Using copying equipment in another office to reproduce classified or sensitive unclassified material when equipment is available in the individual’s own office.
- Obtaining witness signatures on classified document destruction forms when the witness did not observe the destruction.
- Sudden purchase of high value items where no logical income source exists.
- Free spending or lavish display of cash or wealth that appears to be beyond the normal income level of the individual.
- Sudden repayment of loans.
- Foreign travel that does not appear to justify the expense involved.
- Recurring, unexplained weekend trips not associated with recreation or family.
- Pattern of unreported foreign travel.
- Travel to designated countries not sponsored by the DOE or DoD.
- Relatives and friends who have known connections with persons residing in designated countries.
- Requests from relatives or friends in designated countries to provide assistance or information.
A good rule-of-thumb is to report anything that makes you "feel uncomfortable."